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Abstract
This paper presents a model of candidate selection through political parties
where politicians differ in terms of their quality and their favored policies. The
central assumption is that political parties are better informed about their po-
tential candidates than voters are. Questions of interest include whether voters
can gain information about candidates by observing the party’s choice and to
what extent parties select the candidates preferred by the median voter. The
results depend crucially on how competitive the race is. Under strong competi-
tion, nominating a politically more extreme politician is a signal of high quality.
Sufficient competition also induces parties to act in the interest of the median
voter most of the time, even when parties attach very little intrinsic value to
quality. As ideological alignment between the median voter and a party reduces
the degree of competition that this party faces, the median voter can be better
off when parties are polarized.
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lection, primaries.
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1 Introduction
Before the emergence of primary contests, US presidential candidates were se-
lected by the leadership of their respective parties. The popular cliche of the
nominee being chosen in “smoke-filled rooms” by men in black suits with big
cigars captures the sentiment that this process was undemocratic, intranspar-
ent, and ultimately to the disadvantage of voters. In the face of expensive and
drawn-out primary elections, other observers have held that party establish-
ments consist of professional politicians who know their potential candidates
well and can judge which politician has the best chances of getting into office.
Indeed, parties should typically have more information about their potential
candidates than outsiders do. The question is whether they use this superior
information to make informed decisions on behalf of voters or to further their
own interests.
This paper tries to shed some light on these issues through constructing
a theoretical model of candidate selection through party elites. As hinted at
above, the focus of attention will be on the informational advantage of the
party leadership over outsiders. Combined with the assumption that parties are
special interest groups that pursue political goals that differ from the interest
of the (median) voter, this makes it more difficult for electoral incentives to
discipline parties to select good candidates. While they might attach little
weight to the quality of their candidates1, the main interest of parties is to select
candidates that are well aligned with the party line. From the perspective of
voters this creates a problem of hidden information: Did the party select a more
politically extreme candidate because that candidate has high quality or simply
because the candidate shares the political goals of the party?
The trade-off between quality and policy arises because voters and party
members care about the policy preferences that differ from politician to politi-
cian even within one party. For example, voters in Republican primary elections
in the United States are often concerned whether a potential nominee is actu-
ally a “true conservative”. From a theoretical perspective such a concern arises
perhaps because full policy commitment is not possible. Knowing the policy
preferences of a politicians could help to predict her behavior in the case of
unforseen contingencies, for example. In the model this dimension of candidate
1Quality here describes a characteristic of politicians that is valued by voters independently
of the implemented policy, such as honesty or competence. The political economics literature
often uses the term “valence” instead of quality.
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selection is emphasized through the assumption that politicians cannot commit
to any policy and will implement their most preferred one.
The elite centered approach to candidate selection is of more than histori-
cal interest, as it is still used today even in well-established democracies. For
example, in France the responsibility for the nomination of candidates for the
National Assembly rests largely with central parties. In Germany, candidates
for the office of prime minister are formally elected at national party conven-
tions. However, there is typically only one candidate, namely the candidate
previously announced by the party leadership. This example also fits well with
another assumption of the model: Voters know who the potential nominees are
and possess at least some partial information about them. In Germany, public
discussions about who could become the next candidate start well in advance of
the actual nomination. Here, the assumption that will be maintained through-
out most of the paper is that voters are well informed about the policies a
politician stands for while they know little about quality. It could be argued
that the careers of politicians prior to being considered for a nomination are
more informative about policy than quality. After all, politicians make political
decisions along similar ideological fault lines throughout their career. On the
other hand, higher offices may require skills that a politician was not able to
demonstrate before. This argument notwithstanding, a later chapter suggests
that the results are robust to some uncertainty along the policy dimension as
well.
This paper is not the first to analyze how parties generate candidates for
elections. In a seminal paper by Snyder & Ting (2002) voters initially have
no information about individual politicians. By joining a party politicians can
reveal their policy preferences to some extent, as parties impose costs on politi-
cians who are located too far from the party platform. This model seems most
appropriate for politicians in early stages of their career who voters know little
about. Papers where parties play a more active role in nominating candidates
have considered how different methods of selecting candidates induce homoge-
nous candidates to supply effort (Caillaud & Tirole 2002, Castanheira et al.
2010) or have focused exclusively on either the quality/valence dimension or the
policy dimension. Quality is the center of attention in Mattozzi & Merlo (2007,
2010), and Snyder & Ting (2011), while Cadigan & Janeba (2002) and Jackson
et al. (2007) are concerned with policy.2 Contributions that feature both quality
2These last two papers are quite similar to the current one in that they extend a citizen-
candidate model by candidate nomination through parties. Compared to those contributions,
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and policy are Adams & Merrill (2008) and Serra (2011). However, politicians
in these papers are office motivated and do not have policy preferences. In
equilibrium all politicians within a party propose the same policy.
A concurrent paper by Boleslavsky & Cotton (2012) develops a model that
features many of the assumptions made here. The crucial difference is that
in their paper parties have the same information as voters at the time the
nomination is decided. This precludes that the choice of candidate could reveal
any information to voters. The common feature is that the introduction of
imperfectly observed quality softens competition over policies.
Among the papers given above, Adams & Merrill (2008), Serra (2011), and
Snyder & Ting (2011) investigate the question of why parties may choose to
adopt primaries to select their candidates. They take the benefit from primaries
to be that they reveal information about the quality of politicians, with the
most competent one going on to win the nomination. This makes the party
more competitive. The benchmark that this is compared to, however, is that
the party has only one potential candidate or chooses randomly. As Snyder &
Ting (2011) point out (p. 783, footnote 8), ”Naturally, introducing a primary
would benefit a party less electorally if it had an alternative selection mechanism
that more frequently generated the voter’s preferred candidate.”
The answer that this paper provides to the point raised by Snyder and
Ting is that even undemocratic nomination of candidates through the party
leadership can serve the voter surprisingly well. The condition required for
this to hold is that the race is not skewed in favor of one of the competing
parties. If there is too little competition, the likely winner will select candidates
according to her political preferences. The probable loser, on the other hand,
might be forced to select candidates that are closer to the preferred policy
of the median voter. Both sides will place to little weight on quality. With
the right degree of competition, in contrast, parties nominate the preferred
candidates of the median voter based both on policy and quality in almost all
cases. In fact, it can be optimal for the median voter to rely on the better
informed party’s choices rather than collecting additional information about
politicians herself. Remarkably, even the gap between the political interests of
the median voter and the party leadership can work to the advantage of the
median voter. This is because a party who shares the same political goals is
more likely to select candidates that are ex-ante attractive to the median voter.
the results here show that there is less policy convergence when candidates also differ in
quality.
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This weakens competition and reduces the incentives of the party to select high
quality candidates.
The basic model will be presented in the next section. Section 3 describes the
different shapes that equilibrium takes depending on the degree of competition.
In addition, results on welfare and some comparative statics are presented. Sub-
sequently, section 4 relaxes some of the assumptions made in the basic version
of the model. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
N voters (N odd) care about two characteristics of politicians. The first is
their policy preference: Each politician has an ideal policy i ∈ R. The second
characteristic is quality. A politician can either be of low or high quality q ∈
{0, 1}.3 While the quality of the policy maker enters the utility function of voters
directly, they care about policy preferences because it is assumed that elected
politicians implement their ideal policy. In the tradition of citizen-candidate
models, committing to any other policy is not possible. The utility of a voter
with ideal policy x from a policy i implemented by a policy maker with quality
q is
ux(i, q) = −(i− x)2 + q .
The distribution of ideal points x is assumed to be such that the median ideal
point lies at zero.
Politicians belong to either one of two parties. The current incumbent be-
longs to party I and through acting as policy maker has already revealed her
quality qI and ideal policy, which is also denoted by I and assumed to be smaller
than zero.4 Denote by
I ≡ −I2 + qI
the utility that the median voter would receive from reelecting the incumbent.
The second party, party C, has a party leader whose role it is to nominate
one of two politicians as the party’s candidate for the election. The ideal policies
of these two politicians lie in the interval [0, 1]. The politician located further
away from zero is referred to as the extremist and her most preferred policy
3It would also be possible to let quality be a continuous variable. The binary representation
of quality is chosen for simplicity.
4An incumbent is introduced purely to simplify the exposition. It would also be possible to
let two parties compete by choosing candidates, which would yield qualitatively very similar
results.
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is given by E ∈ (0, 1]. Her competitor for the party nomination is called the
moderate, with ideal policy given by M with 0 ≤ M < E. Politicians are
identified by their ideal policies. Voters know that their respective qualities,
qM and qE , independently take the value one with probability pi, which is also
the unconditional expectation of quality. The party leader, on the other hand,
observes qualities directly. All other variables are common knowledge.
The party leader can be thought of as representing the group at the top of
the party hierarchy, which controls the nomination process. The ideal policy
of the party leader is different from the one preferred by the median voter and
assumed to be equal to one. The utility function of the leader is given by
uC(i, q) = −(i− 1)2 + 1ω∈{M,E}(w · q + Y ),
where ω indicates the winner of the election and Y ≥ 1 is a payoff that the leader
receives if the winner belongs to her party. Y is introduced to make sure that
the party leader never prefers the reelection of the incumbent over the election
of one of the politicians belonging to party C. Finally, w is a function that
determines the weight that the party leader attaches to nominating a candidate
of high quality. While w will be defined formally below after some additional
notation has been introduced, it captures the idea that the party leader does not
intrinsically care about the quality of candidates but only because candidates
of higher quality are more likely to be reelected. Accordingly, the party leader
should care less about quality when her party faces weaker competition.
It is worth pausing here for a moment to further discuss some of the features
of the model. The assumption that the ideal policy of the party leader is one
is made for simplicity. What is actually crucial for the results is that the party
leader is located closer to the extremist than to the moderate. Regarding the
politicians of party C, a noteworthy assumption is that the moderate and the
extremist are never at a distance greater than one. This implies that competition
takes place in a range where quality trumps policy: Voters always prefer any
high quality politician over any low quality politician. Allowing politicians to
be further away from each other would not add any equilibria.
The strategic players in this game are the party leader and the median voter.
After observing the quality of her politicians the party leader nominates one of
them as the party’s candidate for the election. The party leaders strategy is
given by the function ηM (qM , qE), which gives the probability that the leader
will nominate the moderate given the realization of the qualities of both politi-
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cians. While this is generally sufficient, it will be convenient to directly refer
to the probability of nomination of the extremist as well, which is given by
ηE(qM , qE) = 1 − ηM (qM , qE). After the nomination decision has been made,
voters update their priors and vote for the incumbent or the challenger nomi-
nated by party C. The outcome of the election is driven by the median voter
and it is therefore sufficient to focus on her behavior. Let r(p) be the probability
that the median voter elects the candidate of party C given that politician p
has been nominated.
The function w, which determines the weight that the party leader places on
quality, can now be defined as a mapping from to the election probabilities of
both politicians of party C to the nonnegative real numbers: w : [0, 1]2 → R+.
The only restriction placed on this function is that w(r(M), r(E)) = 0 if and
only if r(M) = r(E) = 1: The party leader does not care about the quality of
his candidates when both of them would be elected with certainty, but attaches
some weight to it otherwise.
The structure of the game is that of a signaling game, where the party leader
is the sender and the median voter is the receiver. Messages are of the form
“You see I had a choice between these two politicians and I decided to nominate
this one.” In the language of signaling games, the type qC ≡ (qM , qE) of the
party leader is the combination of qualities she observes and the type-space is
Q ≡ {0, 1}2. The posterior probability that the nominated politician is of high
quality is denoted by p¯ip.
Signalling games typically have many perfect Bayesian equilibria, as it is
possible to assign any belief that supports an equilibrium at information sets
that are off the equilibrium path. The same is true here: For example, if voters
believe that the extremist has quality zero, always nominating the moderate
independent of actual qualities is an equilibrium. To be able to make sharper
predictions it is therefore imposed that beliefs off the equilibrium path satisfy
the refinement of Universal Divinity due to Banks & Sobel (1987). To give
an informal description of the requirements of Universal Divinity, suppose that
voters observe that the party leader unexpectedly nominates a certain politi-
cian. Voters then believe with certainty that the quality of the unexpectedly
nominated politician must be such that it makes the leader most likely to gain
from this move. The notion of “the type that is most likely to gain” is for-
malized as the type of leader that gains in utility for the greatest set of voter
responses: Let ρ(p|qC) be the set of election probabilities such that the party
leader of type qC receives a greater expected utility from nominating politician
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p rather than her competitor. If politician p never gets nominated then p¯ip
is restricted to be consistent with the belief that qC = q
∗, where q∗ satisfies
ρ(p|q∗) ⊃ ρ(p|q′) ∀q′ ∈ Q \ q∗.
An additional issue more specific to this particular model is that the party
leader is indifferent between all possible strategies once neither politician be-
longing to party C can get elected. As a consequence the party leader could be
playing the strategy “always nominate the politician with the lowest quality”,
which in turn could make it a best response for the median voter to reelect
the incumbent with certainty. However, it seems implausible that voters would
expect the party leader to behave in this way. In order to circumvent this is-
sue all equilibria that feature weakly dominated strategies are excluded. As
intended this requirement only affects equilibria where both the extremist and
the moderate get defeated by the incumbent with certainty.
Universal Divinity is a strong refinement that does not have a behavioral
justification. However, it is not essential for the analysis. Given the exclusion
of weakly dominated strategies, it would also be possible to use a different
restriction on beliefs that would yield the same results: Let (ηn) be a sequence
of weakly undominated nomination strategies such that under each element of
the sequence both politicians of party C get nominated with positive probability.
Let (p¯inp ) be the sequence of beliefs over the quality of politician p implied by the
sequence of strategies. A posterior belief p¯ip is admissible only if it is possible
to find a sequence (ηn) such that p¯ip is the limit of the beliefs implied by the
strategy sequence, i.e. p¯ip = limn→∞ (p¯inp ).
3 Results
Whether or not a candidate nominated by the leader of Party C stands a chance
of getting elected depends on her political position as well as the expectation of
voters regarding the quality of that candidate. Candidates that are very close
to the median voter’s most preferred policy can get elected even if they are per-
ceived as being of low quality. Conversely, even a candidate far from the center
can be appealing to the median voter if her expected quality is high enough.
However, this expectation of high quality is difficult to maintain. Suppose that
the extremist gets elected with certainty once nominated, because voters be-
lieve that the party leader nominates the moderate if the extremist turns out
to be of low quality. Given this high probability of winning, the leader then
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actually prefers to nominate the extremist even when she is of low quality, since
the extremist is politically closer to the leader. This undermines the initial
expectation that the extremist is of high quality.
The exact shape of equilibrium therefore depends on the positions of both
potential candidates of party C. If both are located close enough to the median
the incumbent never gets reelected. This case is referred to as “No Competi-
tion”. The case labeled “Limited Competition” describes the situation where
only the moderate can get elected. This requires that the moderate is close to
the center while the extremist is indeed too extreme and the median voter can
never be persuaded to elect her. The most interesting case, called “Full Compe-
tition”, features a positive probability of election for either politician belonging
to party C as well as the incumbent. The next three sections explore each case
in more detail. Finally, it is also possible that neither the moderate nor the
extremist stands a chance of being elected. Obviously, this requires that both
politicians are relatively far from the center. Determining the exact conditions
under which this is an equilibrium, however, is a rather technical exercise, which
is therefore relegated to the appendix.
3.1 No Competition
Characterizing this equilibrium is straightforward: If both politicians of party C
are located close enough to the median voter the incumbent never gets reelected:
r(M) = r(E) = 1. As this implies that the party leader places zero weight on
quality, she always prefers to nominate the extremist. Accordingly, voters expect
that the extremist has average quality: p¯iE = pi. This equilibrium exists as long
as the median voter at least weakly prefers the extremist over the incumbent,
which is equivalent to the condition E ≤ √pi − I.
In this equilibrium the median voter has no means to discipline the party
leader who chooses her preferred politician without having to worry about
electability. Consequently, the median voter would be better off if the ideal
policy of the party leader was closer to her own ideal policy. The threshold on
the position of the party leader at which her nomination strategy changes is
the point at which she is equidistant from both politicians: A party leader who
is located closer to the moderate than to the extremist would always nominate
the moderate. The quality of the nominated politicians, however, is average in
either case.5
5To give a complete description of equilibrium the belief of voters over the quality of the
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3.2 Limited Competition
When only one politician in Party C can successfully challenge the incumbent
this is also the only politician that can get nominated. Nominating the candi-
date that loses for sure could only be optimal for the party leader if the utility
from the other candidate getting elected was lower than the utility from the in-
cumbent being reelected. Due to the assumption that the payoff Y from winning
the election is at least one this is impossible. It follows that the party leader
must always be nominating the politician that wins with positive probability.
In this situation voters cannot use Bayes’ rule to update their belief over the
quality of the politician that never gets nominated. The restrictions imposed on
this off-equilibrium path belief by Universal Divinity are given by the following
Lemma.
Lemma 1. Fix some p ∈ {M,E}. An equilibrium in which ηp(qC) = 0 for all
qC ∈ Q satisfies Universal Divinity if and only if p¯ip = 1.
Proof. It needs to be shown that the party leader gains from nominating politician
p for a strictly greater set of election probabilities when qp = 1 rather than qp = 0.
Let p′ denote the competitor for the party nomination of politician p ∈ {M,E}. The
interim utility of the party leader under a strategy profile σ = (ηp, r) where ηp(q) = 0
for all q ∈ Q (politician p is nominated only off the equilibrium path) is given by
r(p′)[−(p′ − 1)2 + w(r(p), r(p′)) · qp′ + Y ] + (1− r(p′))[−(I − 1)2] . (1)
The interim utility of the party leader from deviating to nominating politician p would
be
r(p)[−(p− 1)2 + w(r(p), r(p′)) · qp + Y ] + (1− r(p))[−(I − 1)2] .
Since this last expression is weakly increasing in qp, the party leader must gain from
nominating politician p when qp = 1 whenever she gains from nominating politician
p when qp = 0. It remains to be shown that there exists at least one pair of election
probabilities such that the party leader gains from nominating politician p when qp = 1
but not when qp = 0. Suppose qp = q
′
p = 0. The difference between the two utilities
above is then a continuous function of r(p) and r(p′) that maps from the unit square
to the real numbers. Call this function F (r(p), r(p′)). Due to the restrictions on
parameters, F is negative for r(p′) = 0 and r(p) > 0, while it is positive for r(p′) > 0
moderate would have to be specified as well. According to lemma 1 below, Universal Divinity
implies p¯iM = 1, which makes r(M) the best response of the median voter to the nomination of
the moderate: As the median voter prefers an extremist of average quality over the incumbent,
she must also prefer a moderate of high quality over the incumbent.
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and r(p) = 0. Fix a point in [0, 1]2 such that F is negative and a second point such that
F is positive and restrict F to the line connecting these points. Due to the intermediate
value theorem, there must be a pair (r1, r2) such that F (r1, r2) = 0. Furthermore, as
(r1, r2) 6= (0, 0) it follows that w(r1, r2) 6= 0 by assumption. Accordingly, the party
leader gains from nominating politician p at (r(p), r(p′)) = (r1, r2) for qp = 1 but not
for qp = 0. 
Intuitively, as the party leader prefers to nominate candidates of high qual-
ity, she is most likely to gain from deviating to nominating a different candidate
if that candidate has high quality. Universal Divinity accordingly requires that
voters believe that unexpectedly nominated politicians have high quality. The
politician that never gets elected must consequently be the extremist. Other-
wise the median voter would strictly prefer an unexpectedly nominated mod-
erate over the incumbent and r(M) = 0 would not be a best response to the
nomination of the moderate.
As the moderate is always nominated she is expected to be of average qual-
ity: p¯iM = pi. The median voter has to at least weakly prefer her over the
incumbent in order to elect her with positive probability, which is equivalent
to the condition M ≤ √pi − I. Whenever this holds as a strict inequality the
moderate is elected with certainty. In addition, not electing the extremist must
be a best response. This requires that the median voter at least weakly prefers
the incumbent over an extremist of high quality, which again is the posterior
implied by Universal Divinity. This implies the condition E ≥ √1− I.
Limited Competition is the exact opposite of No Competition in the sense
that in the former case the party leader is completely constrained in her choice
of which politician to nominate. Accordingly, the preferences of the party leader
over policies are of no consequence for the outcome of the nomination process.
3.3 Full Competition
The discussion now turns to the case where both potential candidates of party
C as well as the incumbent ex-ante stand a chance of winning the election. This
type of equilibrium exists when the median voter prefers the extremist over the
incumbent only if she believes the extremist to be of high enough quality. The
choice of the party leader to nominate the extremist must then be a credible
signal that this is indeed the case. This requires that the median voter elects
the moderate more frequently than the extremist. Intuitively, this will make
the moderate a more attractive option for the party leader, and given that
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competition induces the party leader to care about quality, the extremist will
then be less likely to get nominated when she is of low quality.
That the moderate is elected more frequently than the extremist implies
that the extremist is elected with probability strictly between zero and one. In
other words, the median voter must be playing a mixed strategy. This in turn
implies that the median voter must be indifferent between electing the extremist
and reelecting the incumbent. The following theorem states that this is only
possible if the extremist is located such that the median voter would prefer her
over the incumbent if she had high quality but not if she had average quality.
In addition, the moderate cannot be located too far from the median either.
Theorem 1. An equilibrium where both politicians belonging to party C and
the incumbent get elected (i.e. r(M) > 0, r(E) > 0, and r(M) + r(E) < 2)
exists whenever
√
pi − I ≤ E ≤ √1− I and
M ≤
√
pi(I + E2)
I + E2 − pi(1− pi) − I .
Furthermore, r(M) = 1 in any such equilibrium.
Proof. First of all, it is stated without formal proof that it is impossible that 0 <
r(M) < 1 and 0 < r(E) < 1 simultaneously. This would require that the median
voter is indifferent between all candidates, which in turn would require that the party
leader plays a mixed strategy under more than one combination of politician qualities.
Otherwise it is impossible to generate the posterior beliefs that make the median voter
indifferent. As should become clear below, however, indifference of the party leader
between her pure strategies can only hold for one pair of politician qualities at a time.
Next, assume that the politician getting elected with certainty was the extremist.
This would imply that the moderate either never gets nominated or is chosen only in
the case qC = (1, 0), depending on the value of w(r(M), r(E)). Both cases lead to
the posterior belief p¯iM = 1. But if the median voter is willing to elect the extremist
then she must certainly prefer a moderate of high quality over the incumbent as well,
contradicting that r(M) + r(E) < 2.
It must therefore be true that r(M) = 1 and r(E) < 1. This can only hold if the
median voter is indifferent between the incumbent and the extremist, which requires
p¯iE = I + E2 . (2)
To generate this posterior expected quality of the extremist the party leader must be
playing a mixed strategy. In equilibrium mixing is only possible for one particular
realization of qualities as different combinations of qualities require different election
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probabilities to achieve indifference of the party leader as long as w(r(M), r(E)) > 0,
which is the case here. As the moderate gets elected with certainty the expected utility
of the party leader from nominating the moderate is
−(M − 1)2 + w(1, r(E)) · qM + Y
while nominating the extremist gives
r(E)[−(E − 1)2 + w(1, r(E)) · qE + Y ] + (1− r(E))[−(I − 1)2] .
Equating the two utilities it is possible to derive the following identity:
r(E) =
[−(M − 1)2 + w(1, r(E)) · qM + Y ]− [−(I − 1)2]
[−(E − 1)2 + w(1, r(E)) · qE + Y ]− [−(I − 1)2] . (3)
Given the restrictions on parameters the expression on the righthand side is always
positive. In the case of qM = qE = 0 the numerator is smaller than the denominator
and accordingly there exists an election probability r(E) that leaves the party leader
indifferent between nominating either a moderate or an extremist of low quality.
Indifference between politicians of low quality implies that under the quality com-
binations (1, 0) and (0, 1) the party leader nominates the politician of high quality,
while in the case of both having high quality the party leader strictly prefers to nom-
inate the moderate. The last point can be seen by recognizing that in this case the
utility from nominating the moderate is equal to the utility of nominating a moderate
of low quality plus w(1, r(E)) and the utility from nominating the extremist equal
to the utility of nominating an extremist of low quality plus w(1, r(E)r(E)). Hence,
indifference in the (0, 0)-case implies that the difference in utilities from nominating
the moderate and the extremist is equal to w(1, r(E))(1 − r(E)) in the (1, 1)-case,
which is positive. Given this strategy of the party leader, posterior expectations are
given by
p¯iM =
pi
pi + (1− pi)2(1− ηE(0, 0)) (4)
and
p¯iE =
pi
pi + (1− pi)ηE(0, 0) .
Solving this last equality for ηE(0, 0) and using equation (2) to substitute for p¯iE gives
ηE(0, 0) =
pi(1− I − E2)
(1− pi)(I + E2) . (5)
For this expression to be no greater than 1, it must be true that I ≥ −E2+pi. This first
necessary condition for the existence of this equilibrium implies that the denominator
is positive. The second condition, which ensures that the numerator is nonnegative,
is I ≤ −E2 + 1. Finally, it has to be true that the median voter weakly prefers the
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moderate over the incumbent: I ≤ −M2 + p¯iM . After substituting equation (6) into
equation (4) this condition can be written as
I ≤ −M2 + pi(I + E
2)
I + E2 − pi(1− pi) .
For any case other than qM = qE = 0 it is not guaranteed that condition (3) can be
satisfied, as w has not been assumed to be continuous in r(E). All further derivations
are therefore conditional on the existence of a value of r(E) as required.
If the election strategy of the median voter was such that the party leader was in-
different if qM = 0 and qE = 1, then the party leader would strictly prefer to nominate
the moderate whenever the quality of the extremist is zero. This implies p¯iE = 1 and
contradicts that the median voter could be indifferent between the incumbent and the
extremist.
Indifference under qM = 1 and qE = 0, on the other hand, would result in the
nomination of the extremist whenever she has high quality and when both politicians
have low quality. The posterior beliefs are then
p¯iM = 1
and
p¯iE =
pi
pi + (1− pi)2 + (1− pi)piηE(1, 0) .
Solving this last equality for ηE(1, 0) and using equation (2) to substitute for p¯iE gives
ηE(1, 0) =
pi − [pi + (1− pi2)](I + E2)
(1− pi)pi(I + E2) . (6)
The necessary and sufficient conditions for this expression to be positive and no greater
than one are
−E2 + pi ≤ I ≤ −E2 + pi
pi + (1− pi2) .
The requirement that the median voter at least weakly prefers the moderate over the
incumbent in this case is equivalent to the condition I ≤ −M2 + 1.
Finally, suppose the party leader is indifferent between nominating either politician
if both are of high quality. Proceeding as before, an equilibrium with this feature can
be shown to exists under the same conditions as in the previous paragraph 
As the preceding proof shows, there are up to three equilibria that satisfy
the definition of Full Competition. In one the party leader is indifferent between
nominating either politician if both are of low quality (“low quality indifference”)
while in the other two cases - whose existence is not guaranteed - indifference
holds for other combinations of qualities. The equilibrium with low quality
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Figure 1: Equilibrium for different positions of politicians
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indifference exists more widely, as can be seen in figure 1, which exemplifies the
existence conditions for the different types of equilibria for given characteristics
of the incumbent and a specific average quality. The possible combinations of
M and E lie below the 45-degree line, as M < E. All areas where more than
one equilibrium exists are shaded. The No Competition equilibrium exists in
area 1, when both politicians are relatively close to zero. Full Competition
occurs in area 2 and both shaded areas. Within this area, the equilibrium with
low quality indifference exists everywhere while the other two cases are confined
to the shaded region bordering on area 1. In area 3, where the extremist is
located far from the median, the Limited Competition equilibrium is the unique
equilibrium. Finally, in area 4 and the bordering shaded region equilibria exist
where no politician of party C can get elected as both of them are too far from
zero.6
Given that the equilibrium with low quality indifference exists more generally
it will from here on be the equilibrium referred to when discussing the Full
6The boundaries on this region are derived in the appendix.
15
Competition case. In this equilibrium electoral incentives work very well in
disciplining the party leader. The only case where the party leader does not
always nominate the politician preferred by the median voter is the case of
both politicians having low quality. Importantly, the fact that the party leader
otherwise follows the preference of the median voter in her nomination choice is
not driven by the party leader’s own preference for politicians of high quality.
In fact, w(r(M), r(E)) can be arbitrarily small as long as it remains positive.
This is because in equilibrium the ideological appeal of the extremist is weighed
up by her lower electability. The party leader’s decision is therefore driven by
quality even when she attaches little value to quality in general.
While the expected quality of the extremist is always such that the median
voter is indifferent between the extremist and the incumbent, the relationship
between the expected quality of the moderate and of the extremist depends
on the utility that the median voter gets from reelecting the incumbent, I,
which can be interpreted as the degree of competition. If I is relatively low and
there is only moderate competition, expected quality is higher for the moderate
than for the extremist as in the No Competition case described above. As I
becomes larger and competition intensifies this relationship reverses. In short,
it is electability that determines which choice of nominee signals higher quality.
The ideological preferences of the party have a tendency to make the extremist
look like the weaker candidate, but this is not true if this nomination choice
implies a significant drop in the chance of winning the election.
The mixed strategy that the median voter plays when the extremist is nom-
inated reflects the difficulty in maintaining the expectation that the extremist
has high quality. Electing her any more frequently would make the extremist
too attractive from the perspective of the party leader, which in turn would
lower her expected quality and render this candidate a sure loser. A second
interpretation of the mixed strategy is that the party leader is uncertain over
the exact position of the median voter, which shows that the assumption of full
information about the distribution of voters can be relaxed. It is also in this
interpretation that the tradeoff in terms of electability and ideology that the
party leader faces becomes clearest: The party leader knows that increasing the
probability of nominating the extremist when she is of low quality will reduce
the chance that the median voter will be willing to vote for her. An equilibrium
is only reached, however, when the higher chance of winning of the moderate
and the ideological advantage of the extremist balance out. Even though the
reelection of the incumbent is certainly the worst outcome for the party leader,
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she does not always nominate the politician who is most likely to defeat the
incumbent.
3.4 Welfare and comparative statics
As has been pointed out in the previous section, parties do a pretty good job at
selecting high quality candidates under Full Competition. In fact, parties max-
imize the average quality of their candidates in this equilibrium. This is simply
a consequence of the fact that the party leader never nominates a politician of
low quality when a politician of high quality is available.7 The maximal average
quality is equal to the probability that at least one politician has high quality,
which is 1− (1− pi)2.
Using this result, it is possible to derive a simplified expression of the utility
of the median voter under Full Competition, which is generally given by
η˜M (−M2 + p¯iM ) + η˜E [r(E)(−E2 + p¯iE) + (1− r(E))I] ,
where η˜p denotes the ex-ante probability that politician p gets nominated. In
the Full Competition case the median voter is indifferent between the extremist
and the incumbent: −E2 + p¯iE = I. The previous expression can therefore be
written as
η˜M (−M2 + p¯iM ) + η˜E(−E2 + p¯iE) .
Using the fact that average quality is equal to 1− (1− pi)2 yields
η˜M (−M2) + η˜E(−E2) + 1− (1− pi)2 . (7)
This expression will be useful in the welfare comparisons below.
3.4.1 Increasing Competition
A crucial determinant of the shape that equilibrium takes is the strength of the
incumbent, as given by the utility I that the median voter experiences in the
7Proof: The average posterior quality of the moderate and the extremist is equal to the
sum of their posterior qualities weighted by their respective nomination probabilities. The
posterior quality of each candidate is given by the probability of being nominated conditional
on having high quality divided by the unconditional nomination probability. The nomination
probability therefore cancels out and the average quality is given simply by the sum of the
nomination probabilities conditional on having high quality. This is maximized when no low
quality candidate is nominated whenever a high quality candidate is available.
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case of reelection of the incumbent. A natural interpretation of I is that it rep-
resents the degree of electoral competition that the party of the challenger faces.
From this perspective the model generates a prediction about the relationship
between electoral competition and the expected quality of politicians. This can
be seen by fixing a combination of political positions for the moderate and the
extremist, i.e. a point in figure 1. For low enough values of I any such point will
lie in region 1, where party C faces No Competition. Increasing I (increasing
competition) shifts the boundaries that separate the different types of equilibria
towards the origin. Therefore, eventually the “Full Competition”-case applies.
This is connected with an increase in the quality of nominated politicians, as
higher competition forces the incumbent to select candidates of higher quality.
Increasing competition even further can have either one of two effects. If the
moderate and the extremist are located close to each other (their position gen-
erate a point close to the 45-degree line in figure 1) increasing I will make the
incumbent the certain winner of the election. If, on the other hand, there is a
clear political difference between the moderate and the extremist, there exists
an interval for values of I in which equilibrium takes the shape of what was la-
beled Limited Competition, where only the moderate has a chance of defeating
the incumbent. The step from Full Competition to Limited Competition leads
to a reduction in the quality of the nominated politicians, as the party leader
effectively has a smaller set of politicians to choose from.
Taken as a whole, the model predicts a nonlinear relationship between com-
petition and quality. Starting from a low level, increasing competition is benefi-
cial as it disciplines parties to select high quality candidates. In contrast, more
intense competition can force parties to select candidates more on policy and
less on quality when the election is already fiercely contested.
It should be noted that competition has been framed from the perspective
of one party in this discussion. More generally speaking, one would actually
consider the most competitive situation to be the one in which both parties face
equal chances. In this perspective the model indeed predicts higher competition
to lead to the nomination of candidates of higher quality. The unexpected
result here is that reduced competition leads to worse outcomes both on the
advantaged and the disadvantaged side.
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3.4.2 Comparison to Full Information Equilibrium
The introduction raised the question of whether the party leader can act as a
better informed agent who selects candidates on behalf of the voter. As was
already discussed above, in the case of Full Competition electoral incentives
work very well in disciplining the party leader. One way to make this point
even more forcefully is to compare the outcomes described so far to the case
where the voter has full information about politicians. In any case other than
Full Competition having more information must work to the benefit of the
median voter: Under No Competition the party leader nominates her optimal
candidate, which she might not be able to do under full information. In the
case when no candidate of party C can get elected, the median voter receives
the lowest possible expected utility under asymmetric information by always
reelecting the incumbent. Consequently, she must at least be weakly better off
under full information. Under Limited Competition even an extremist of high
quality will lose against the incumbent, implying that the party leader has no
leeway to nominate other politicians than before.
The last point is not true in the case of Full Competition. When choosing
between two politicians of high quality the party leader picks the moderate here,
as long as the median voter does not observe quality. However, under full in-
formation an extremist of high quality would also get elected, as otherwise the
median voter could never be indifferent between the extremist and the incum-
bent. It follows that the median voter is worse off if she observes the quality of
candidates than if she does not in the case where both are of high quality.
To see that this effect may be strong enough to also lower the expected utility
of the median voter ex-ante, before politician qualities are realized, suppose that
the incumbent is relatively weak: I ≤ −M2. Under asymmetric information
the extremist always gets nominated if qC = (0, 1) and with probability ηE(0, 0)
if both politicians have low quality, i.e. η˜E = pi(1−pi) + (1−pi)2ηE(0, 0). Using
expression (7) the expected utility of the median voter is therefore
[1− pi(1− pi)− (1− pi)2ηE(0, 0)](−M2)
+ [pi(1− pi) + (1− pi)2ηE(0, 0)](−E2) + 1− (1− pi)2 .
In the case of full information the extremist gets nominated whenever she has
high quality, but not when she has low quality. The expected utility of the
19
median voter in this case is
(1− pi)(−M2) + pi(−E2) + 1− (1− pi)2 ,
as it was assumed that when both politicians of party C are of low quality the
moderate can still get elected. The difference between the two utilities is
[−pi2 + (1− pi)2ηE(0, 0)](M2 − E2) .
As M2−E2 is always smaller than zero, the sign of this expression is determined
by the sign of the term in brackets. If
−pi2 + (1− pi)2ηE(0, 0) < 0
then the median voter is worse off under full information. Using equation (6) to
substitute for ηE(0, 0) this condition can be seen to be equivalent to −E2 + 1 <
I + pi, which is neither implied nor contradicted by the existence conditions
of the Full Competition equilibrium. However, as −E2 < I must hold in this
equilibrium the median voter is worse off under full information for values of pi
close to one.
If the incumbent is stronger and I ≤ −M2 does not hold the utility of the
median voter is higher under full information than in the previous case. It is
then even less likely that having more information could be harmful. Neverthe-
less, that this effect occurs at least in some cases certainly illustrates how well
electoral incentives work under Full Competition.
3.4.3 Common interests
A second central question raised in the introduction was whether the special
interests of the party imply that it will select “bad” candidates. As was pointed
out in previous sections, in the case of No Competition the median voter would
indeed be better off if the party leader shared her political interests. In the case
of Limited Competition, on the other hand, the preferences of the party leader
over policies were of no consequence. What has not been taken into account so
far though is that the existence conditions for the different types of equilibria
also depend on the preferences of the party leader. These boundaries are shown
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Figure 2: Equilibrium under common interests
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in figure 2, which is the equivalent of figure 1 for a party leader located at zero.8
The boundaries on the equilibrium where the incumbent always gets reelected
(area 4) and the Limited Competition equilibrium (area 3) are unchanged. In
contrast, the equilibrium where both the moderate and the extremist get elected
with certainty exists much more widely, namely in area 1 in figure 2. Previously,
the binding constraint on the existence of the No Competition equilibrium was
that the median voter had to prefer an extremist of average quality over the
incumbent. A party leader with the same preferences as the median voter, in
contrast, always selects the moderate while the extremist is believed to be of
high quality according to lemma 1. This shifts the boundary on the existence
of this equilibrium outwards. Full Competition occurs in area 2.9
The change of the welfare of the median voter in the area where under
diverging interests Full Competition applies while under common interests the
8The derivation of the equilibria in the C = 0-case will not be given here as it proceeds
exactly as in the case of C = 1.
9More precisely, Full competition with low quality indifference occurs in area 2. As before,
other equilibria that satisfy the definition of Full Competition might exist as well, but are not
further considered here, in line with the discussion above.
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moderate is always nominated is not immediately clear. Diverging interests lead
to the nomination of higher quality candidates, while common interests result
in the nomination of the preferred politician in terms of policy. In the latter
case, the utility of the median voter is −M2 + pi. Under diverging interests,
expression (7) shows that the expected utility of the median voter is given by
[pi + (1− pi)2(1−ηE(0, 0))](−M2)
+ [pi(1− pi) + (1− pi)2ηE(0, 0)](−E2) + 1− (1− pi)2 .
Using equation (6) to substitute for ηE(0, 0), some tedious but straightforward
algebra shows that the difference in the utilities can be written as −I −M2.
Therefore, the median voter is better off under common interests in this partic-
ular case if and only if −M2 > I. In words, the median voter has to prefer a
moderate of low quality over the incumbent - a rather strong condition.
Similarly, common interests can work to the advantage or the disadvantage of
the median voter in the case where Full Competition applies both under common
and diverging interests, which will not be shown formally here. Without knowing
the distributions that the characteristics of politicians are drawn from, it is
therefore not clear whether the special interests of the party make the median
voter better or worse off. However, there seems to be substantial possibility of
the former. The reason for this is that a party leader is more likely to nominate
a candidate who is ex-ante attractive to the median voter if they share the same
political interests. This, however, reduces competition and therefore leads to
the selection of candidates of worse quality.
4 Robustness
The model features a number of assumptions that can be relaxed. First of all,
the results are robust to adding some uncertainty over the position of the median
voter. As was already stated in the discussion of the case of Full Competition, it
is possible to interpret the mixed strategy that the median voter is playing in this
vein. In contrast, all other equilibria do not feature mixing by the median voter
but are nevertheless robust in a similar way. Here the differences between the
possible candidates are so large that uncertainty over the position of the median
voter would not translate into uncertainty over the outcome of the election.
Two further assumptions that will be discussed in more detail in the following
two subsections are the additive separability of quality in the utility function of
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the median voter and the discrepancy between full information over politicians’
positions and uncertainty over their quality.
4.1 Non-additive quality
Specifying quality as additively separable from policy has received criticism in
the past. The main argument is that it seems implausible that, for example, a
left-wing voter would want a right-wing candidate to be very effective at imple-
menting policy. Put differently, quality should become a bad for a sufficiently
high political distance. Indeed, a recent paper by Gouret et al. (2011) lends
empirical support to this argument. Using data from the French presidential
election of 2007 the authors find that a utility function that allows for said in-
teraction between quality and policy fits the data well while the simple additive
utility function is rejected. However, this result seems to be mainly driven by
voters away from the center. The parameter estimates indicate that the main
candidates are well within the range in which higher quality is beneficial to
the median voter. While the policy space in the analyzed survey data ranges
from zero to 10, the distance at which quality becomes a bad is estimated to
be slightly above five. The main candidates, on the other hand, are no further
away from each other than roughly three. The different potential candidates
available to each party should be even closer together. As the outcomes of the
model presented here are driven by the preferences of the party leader and the
median voter, the results of Gouret et al. (2011) should therefore not raise too
many concerns.
4.2 Uncertainty about politicians’ policy preferences
The distribution of information imposed in the model may seem to lack a strong
justification. While voters know much about the policies a candidate stands for
they know little about quality. Furthermore, many of the findings seem to
rest on this skewed information structure: Voters observe policy preferences
and are able to make inferences about the quality of candidates based on this
observation. This section will argue that it is possible to introduce uncertainty
about the policy positions of politicians while leaving the main results intact.
To this end, suppose that the policy positions of the candidates of party C, M
and E, are drawn from the distributions functions FM and FE respectively. For
the moment these will not be specified any further. A party leader confronted
with a particular draw of positions and qualities will decide whom to nominate
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based on a comparison of the expected utility resulting from either choice. This
utility depends on the chance of each politician of winning the election. To
keep things reasonably simple, the disutility from policy will now be given by
the absolute value, rather than the square, of the difference between policy and
ideal position of an agent. Furthermore, assume that the party leader expects
that the moderate would get elected with certainty while the extremist would
get elected with probability r(E), as in the Full Competition case above. The
decision rule of the party leader is then to nominate the moderate if and only if
−|M − 1|+ w(1, r(E))qM + Y ≥ r(E)[−|E − 1|+ w(1, r(E))qE + Y ] +
(1− r(E))[−|I − 1|]
or equivalently
M − r(E)E ≥ r(E)[w(1, r(E))qE + Y ] + (1− r(E))I − w(1, r(E))qM − Y
≡ K(qC) .
This choice rule implies that under different quality combinations politicians will
be nominated with different probabilities and the nomination choice can there-
fore still be a signal of quality. The expected quality of a moderate nominated
according to this rule is
p¯iM =
∑
q∈{0,1} pi Pr[qE = q] Pr[M − r(E)E ≥ K(qC)|qC = (q, 1)]∑
q∈Q Pr[qC = q] Pr[M − r(E)E ≥ K(qC)|qC = q]
,
which is simply the probability that the moderate gets nominated conditional
on being of high quality divided by the unconditional nomination probability.
One way to find an expression for Pr[M − r(E)E ≥ K(qC)] is to first derive the
density of the random variable M − r(E)E. This is given by∫
supp(FE)
fE(e)fM (τ + r(E)e) de .
Appropriately integrating over this density one obtains the desired probabil-
ity. The expression for the posterior quality of the extremist can be derived
analogously.
Beyond quality the nomination choice can now also be a signal of the policy
position of a candidate. Considering the decision rule of the party leader, one
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observation is immediate: If all possible candidates are closer to the median
than the party leader, then it is impossible that the expectation of the poste-
rior distribution of the policy position of a nominated politician is below the
expectation of the prior distribution. If the party leader prefers to nominate the
moderate for a given M then she must ceteris paribus prefer to nominate the
moderate for any higher M as well, implying that the posterior distribution first
order stochastically dominates the prior distribution. The same holds for the
extremist. Therefore, if a nomination tells voters anything about the policies a
candidate stands for then that these are more extreme than previously thought.
In other words, politically extreme parties are bad for the median voter in terms
of the political views of the candidates they select.
To find an expression for the expected policy position of a moderate nomi-
nated according to the decision rule above, first note that according to Bayes’
Rule the posterior probability density over M conditional on a certain quality
combination q is given by
fM |q(m) ≡ fM (m)Pr[M − r(E)E ≥ K(qC)|M = m, qC = q]
Pr[M − r(E)E ≥ K(qC)|qC = q]
with
Pr[M − r(E)E ≥ K(qC)|M = m, qC = q] = FE ([m−K(qC)]/r(E)) .
The unconditional expected policy position of a nominated moderate is then
given by the weighted sum of the conditional expectations:∑
q∈Q Pr[qC = q] Pr[M − r(E)E ≥ K(qC)|qC = q]
∫
supp(FM )
m fM |q(m) dm∑
q∈Q Pr[qC = q] Pr[M − r(E)E ≥ K(qC)|qC = q]
.
Again, the expected policy position of the extremist follows analogously.
Giving a general description of equilibrium is beyond the scope of this paper.
Instead, a specific example will be given to illustrate that the characteristics of
the Full Competition equilibrium emphasized above remain unchanged in the
extended model. It is assumed that both M and E are uniformly distributed
with support [0.2, 0.5] and [0.4, 0.7], respectively. The moderate is expected to
be closer to the median than the extremist, but the opposite might actually be
the case. In addition, the probability of a politician being of high quality is
taken to be equal to 0.5 and the functional form of w(r(M), r(E)) is assumed
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Figure 3: Expected utilities with uncertain policy positions
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to be
w(r(M), r(E)) = 0.5(1− r(M))1/2 + 0.5(1− r(E))1/2 .
Figure 3 plots the expected utility of the median voter from electing either
politician of party C, which can be calculated using the expressions above, as
a function of the probability r(E) that the extremist will get elected. For low
values of r(E) the party leader always selects the moderate and both expected
utilities are flat in this region.10 As r(E) increases the party leader finds it
worthwhile to nominate the extremist for high values of E in the case where
the extremist has high quality and the moderate has low quality, and eventually
also for lower values of E. This makes the extremist less extreme in expectation
and explains the initial increase in the expected utility from electing her. For
10In the extended model Universal Divinity implies that an unexpectedly nominated politi-
cian p is of high quality and located as close to the party leader as possible given the distri-
bution Fp.
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even higher values of r(E) the extremist gets nominated under other quality
combination as well, which lowers her expected quality and results in a decrease
in utility for the median voter. The increase in the expected utility from electing
the moderate, on the other hand, stems from the fact that her expected quality
increases as it becomes more attractive to nominate the extremist. For values of
r(E) close to one the weight that the party leader attaches to quality becomes
very low and selection is based more and more on which candidate is politically
closer to the party leader, leading to an eventual decrease in both utilities.
Figure 3 shows that there is a range of utilities I from reelecting the incum-
bent for which it is possible to find an election probability of the extremist such
that the median voter is indifferent between the extremist and the incumbent
while strictly preferring the moderate. This is equivalent to the Full Competi-
tion equilibrium described above.
5 Conclusion
This paper has shown that under sufficiently strong competition the median
voter can rely to a large extent on parties to select “good” candidates even
when parties pursue special political interests and value the quality of their
politicians only very little. As more extreme candidates are less likely to get
elected, the nomination of such candidates serves as a signal of above average
quality. This enables parties to get politicians into office who stand for policies
that are closer to the interests of the party, but given their higher expected
quality this is also beneficial for the median voter.
The downside is that parties prioritize ideology and select low quality candi-
dates when competition fails. Such failure is common at sub-national levels of
government where often only one party stands a realistic chance of holding office.
This seems to happen in districts where the electorate is politically more aligned
with one particular party than at the national level. It is not entirely clear why
this does not cause existing parties to alter their positions or results in the entry
of additional parties or independent candidates. A better understanding of the
role of political parties is likely to provide an answer.
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Appendix
This appendix derives bounds on the existence of equilibria where the incumbent
is reelected with certainty. When no politician of party C is elected with positive
probability the party leader is indifferent between any of her pure strategies.
Given the restrictions on equilibrium strategies, whether this case can be an
equilibrium crucially depends on which posterior beliefs can be generated by
weakly undominated strategies.
Fix an arbitrary nomination strategy η and let m(η) be the ex-ante proba-
bility that the moderate gets nominated under η. A second strategy η′ weakly
dominates η only if m(η) = m(η′): In the case m(η) > m(η′) the expected
utility of the party leader under η would be strictly higher under η than under
η′ given that ε(M) = 1 and ε(E) = 0, i.e. the median voter elects the moderate
for sure and never elects the extremist. Similarly, if m(η) > m(η′) η gives a
strictly higher utility for ε(M) = 0 and ε(E) = 1.
Given this first result, the intuition for which strategies are weakly domi-
nated can be given as follows: A strategy η is weakly dominated if and only if
it is possible to find a second strategy η′ such that m(η) = m(η′) and η′ nomi-
nates politician p more frequently when this politician is of high quality and less
frequently when this politician is of low quality, relative to η. The remainder of
the proof formalizes this idea.
It is claimed that any nomination strategy that features ηM (0, 1) > 0 and
ηM (1, 1) < 1 is weakly dominated. Construct a second strategy η
′
M by setting
η′M (1, 1) = ηM (1, 1)+ε and η
′
M (0, 1) = ηM (0, 1)− pi1−pi ε with ε > 0 and leaving all
other nomination probabilities unchanged relative to ηM . Choosing ε sufficiently
small ensures that all probabilities in the new strategy η′M are well defined. By
construction, both politicians ex-ante get nominated with the same probability
under ηM and η
′
M . The only difference between the two strategies is that for
the quality combination (1, 1) the moderate is nominated more frequently under
η′M than under ηM , while for the quality combination (0, 1) the moderate is
nominated less frequently. The expected utility of the party leader under the
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strategy ηM can be written as∑
q∈Q
Pr[qC = q]
{
ηM (q)
[
r(M)(−(M − 1)2 + Y + w(r(M), r(E))qM )
+ (1− r(M))(−(I − 1)2)]
+ (1− ηM (q))
[
r(E)(−(E − 1)2 + Y + w(r(M), r(E))qE)
+ (1− r(E))(−(I − 1)2)] }.
Define UM ≡ −(M − 1)2 + Y , UE ≡ −(E − 1)2 + Y , and UI ≡ −(I − 1)2. The
difference in the expected utilities under η′M and ηM is
pi2 ε
{
r(M)(UM + w(r(M), r(E))) + (1− r(M))UI
− r(E)(UE + w(r(M), r(E)))− (1− r(E))UI
}
−pi(1− pi) pi
1− pi ε
{
r(M)UM + (1− r(M))UI
− r(E)(UE + w(r(M), r(E)))− (1− r(E))UI
}
,
which is equal to pi2 ε r(M) w(r(M), r(E)) and nonnegative for any election
strategy r. This shows that η′M weakly dominates ηM .
By analogous arguments any strategy such that either ηM (0, 0) > 0 and
ηM (1, 0) < 1, ηM (0, 0) < 1 and ηM (0, 1) > 0, or ηM (1, 0) < 1 and ηM (1, 1) > 0,
is weakly dominated as well. Now consider a strategy such that ηM (1, 0) < 1.
For this strategy not to be weakly dominated it must be true that ηM (0, 0) = 0
and ηM (1, 1) = 0 by the second and fourth rule above, which in turn leads to
the requirement ηM (0, 1) = 0 by the third rule. Any resulting strategy is not
weakly dominated, as the construction of a weakly dominating strategy would
require reducing the probability of nominating a high quality moderate.
Next, consider a strategy such that ηM (1, 0) = 1 and ηM (0, 1) > 0. By the
first and third rule given above it must hold that ηM (1, 1) = 1 and ηM (0, 0) = 1
for this strategy to not be weakly dominated. Similar to before, to find a strategy
that could weakly dominate this strategy it would be necessary to reduce the
probability of nominating a high quality extremist, which would reduce utility
against most strategies of the party leader.
Finally, let ηM (1, 0) = 1 and ηM (0, 1) = 0. None of the conditions above
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imposes any restrictions on ηM (0, 0) and ηM (1, 1). Furthermore, any strategy of
this kind is not weakly dominated. Raising the probability of nominating a high
quality politician while keeping the ex-ante nomination probabilities constant
necessarily implies reducing the probability of nominating the second politician
when she is of high quality by an equivalent amount.
To summarize, there are only three different types of nomination strategies
that are not weakly dominated:
• ηM (1, 0) = 1, ηM (0, 1) = 0, 0 ≤ ηM (0, 0) ≤ 1, 0 ≤ ηM (1, 1) ≤ 1
• ηM (1, 0) = 1, ηM (0, 1) > 0, ηM (0, 0) = 1, ηM (1, 1) = 1
• ηM (1, 0) < 1, ηM (0, 1) = 0, ηM (0, 0) = 0, ηM (1, 1) = 0
The second of these strategies nominates the extremist only if she has high
quality and consequently p¯iE = 1 in this case. For the moderate this strategy
implies
p¯iM =
pi
pi + pi(1− pi)ηM (0, 1) + (1− pi)2 .
This expression achieves its minimum of pi for ηM (0, 1) = 1. The conditions
I > −M2+pi and I > −E2+1 are therefore jointly sufficient for the existence of
an equilibrium where r(M) = r(E) = 0. Similarly, the third strategy nominates
the moderate only if she has high quality and p¯iM = 1 must hold, while the
lowest posterior expectation over the quality of the extremist that this strategy
can generate is pi for ηM (1, 0) = 0. This implies the joint sufficient conditions
I > −M2+1 and I > −E2+pi, where the second condition is satisfied whenever
the first condition holds.
For the first of the weakly undominated strategies given above the posterior
expectations are
p¯iM =
pi(1− pi) + pi2ηM (1, 1)
pi(1− pi) + pi2ηM (1, 1) + (1− pi)2ηM (0, 0) (8)
and
p¯iE =
pi(1− pi) + pi2(1− ηM (1, 1))
pi(1− pi) + pi2(1− ηM (1, 1)) + (1− pi)2(1− ηM (0, 0)) . (9)
This strategy generates p¯iE = 1 if and only if ηM (0, 0) = 1 and the lowest value
of the posterior expectation p¯iM that can be achieved in this case is pi, which
implies the same sufficient conditions as the first set of conditions given in the
previous paragraph. On the other hand, the lowest value that the righthand
30
side of equation (9) can take is pi. Together with the previous results this shows
that no undominated strategy can lead to a posterior expected quality below
pi for any politician. It remains to show which sufficient conditions the current
strategy yields if E is such that −E2 + pi ≤ I ≤ −E2 + 1. This requires for any
such E to find the lowest M such that the median voter is indifferent between
the incumbent and both politicians of party C. This M satisfies I = −M2+p¯i∗M ,
where p¯i∗M is the solution to the minimization problem
min
0≤x,y≤1
pi(1− pi) + pi2x
pi(1− pi) + pi2x+ (1− pi)2y
s.t. − E2 + pi(1− pi) + pi
2(1− x)
pi(1− pi) + pi2(1− x) + (1− pi)2(1− y) = I
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